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Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the
IMF Articles of Agreement
and Public Policy
For more than thirty years Sir Joseph Gold and the present author have
commented on each other's activities concerning the law of exchange controls.
The present article returns to our very first exchange of ideas. In an article
published in 19571 the present author had tried to limit what he thought to be
rather sweeping statements in the Executive Directors' Interpretation of June 10,
1949,2 of article VIII, section 2(b) of the IMF Articles of Agreement concerning
the role of public policy (ordre public) in relation to exchange contracts. After
having stated that by accepting the Fund Agreement members have undertaken to
make the principle of unenforceability of exchange contracts effectively part of
their national law, the interpretation continues:
An obvious result of the foregoing undertaking is that if a party to an exchange contract
of the kind referred to in Article VIII, Section 2(b) seeks to enforce such a contract, the
tribunal of the member country before which the proceedings are brought will not, on
the ground that they are contrary to the public policy of the forum, refuse recognition
of the exchange control regulations of the other member which are maintained or
imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement.
Resuming our position in his recent book, Gold appears to share our view that
the main purpose of the interpretation is to rule out reliance on the public policy
objection "simply because the regulations are those of another country. ' 3
However, the present author, at least, does not deem reliance on this objection
inadmissible against any exchange control regulation whatsoever emanating
from another member country. The target of the interpretation was the attitude
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especially of Swiss courts, which were not ready to see much difference between
an outright taking of an asset without indemnity and making the right to dispose
of the asset concerned subject to exchange control regulations.4 Therefore, these
courts held any reliance on a foreign exchange control regulation to be just as
contrary to their public policy as a foreign confiscation. We must confess that from
our own experience we felt much sympathy with this view. We can, however, see
the advantage the IMF members hoped to achieve by a mutual recognition of their
exchange control regulations. We, too, therefore deem it inadmissible to hold any
such regulation per se contrary to the public policy of the forum State.
Nevertheless, we were and remain opposed to the interpretation if the latter
intends to cover also cases "where a member might apply approved regulations
in a discriminatory manner." 5 These words are a correct rendering by Gold of the
gist of our argument and yet they are a source of misunderstanding. Gold seems
to believe that our reference to "discrimination" intended to allude to discrim-
inatory currency arrangements. He assumes that we would admit the rejection of
any such discriminatory arrangement by recourse to the public policy argument,
whether or not the arrangement concerned had been approved by the Fund
pursuant to article VIII, section 3. As a matter of fact, we hold that in some, but
not in all, instances of discriminatory currency arrangements, recourse to public
policy arguments should be admissible-but what we had in mind in writing the
quoted passage was something different. We believe that there may be instances
where foreign exchange control regulations shall be just as much open to public
policy objections as any other rules of foreign law. Article VIII, section 2(b)
merely rules out holding any foreign exchange control regulation as such
incompatible with the public policy of the forum. Yet, there may be instances
where such a regulation will appear contrary to the public policy of the forum,
for example, where it is used as a means of persecution. If it is possible to reject
the requirement of the marriage law of a foreign State that the spouses have to
obtain a marriage license, when such a requirement is used as a means of racial
persecution, why should such a foreign State's exchange control law be above
such scrutiny? Gold quotes approvingly 6 from the court's opinion in In re
Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd.7 that effect must be given to exchange control
measures where the law of the foreign State is the proper law of the contract or
where the movable is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the State. That,
however, is subject to the qualifications that this court is entitled to be satisfied
that the foreign law is a genuine foreign exchange law, that is, a law passed with
the genuine intention of protecting its economy in times of national stress and for
that purpose regulating (inter alia) the rights of foreign creditors, and is "not a
4. R. OBERSON, L'ORDRE PUBLIC EN MATItRE MON tARE 43 (1956).
5. III J. GOLD, supra note 3, at 747 (commenting on the article mentioned supra note 1).
6. Id. at 489-90.
7. 1 All E. R. 129 (1956).
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law passed ostensibly with that object but in reality with some object not in
accordance with the usage of nations."
8
We share this view and venture to include the protection of basic human rights
in the present-day usage of nations. However, the forum should go further than
holding application of a foreign law contrary to the forum's public policy in
instances where a law of racial or political persecution is camouflaged as an
exchange control law. The authorities of a persecutor State are just as likely to
abuse an exchange control law, having obtained the Fund's approval, to
camouflage an act of persecution. Should the forum be unable to react by holding
such act to be contrary to its public policy? Let us give an example. A foreign
firm appoints a manager to look after its assets in the forum. The firm, as part of
its employment contracts subject to the law of its seat State, grants a pension to
these expatriate managers. With the approval of the Fund the seat State of the
firm introduces exchange control legislation making payments to residents of the
forum subject to a license. Whereas licenses are granted for pension payments to
other former managers resident in the forum State, the firm cannot obtain such
a license for the pension due its former manager X, who belongs to a race, class,
religion, ethnic group, or political party that has become the target of persecution
by the seat State of the firm. Should the firm indeed be entitled to rely on article
VIII, section 2(b) and on its interpretation by the Fund as a defense against a
claim by X brought in the forum State to satisfy his pension claim out of the
assets of the firm in the forum?
The answer may be less certain in the all too frequent cases where economic
misery and persecution go hand in hand. If the foreign exchange situation of the
State concerned is so bad that this State is unable to grant any license for pension
payments, should the fact that X qualifies as persecutee entitle him to have his
pension claim satisfied whereas the claims of his nonpersecuted colleagues
should fail? If their aversion to persecution should lead the courts of the forum
State to arrive at that result, would not such a judgment encourage other residents
of the persecutor State to pose as persecutees in order to circumvent its exchange
control regulations? The courts of the forum would then have the unenviable
burden of establishing the real motives of the claimants and of the State
concerned in each individual case. This task would be just as difficult as
distinguishing between genuine seekers of political asylum and "economic
refugees," persons emigrating from a country mainly in order to improve their
economic situation, but also to escape from an oppressive regime that has caused
the economic ruin of the country concerned.
Like Gold 9 we believe that some inquiry into the motives behind the
enactment and the handling of exchange control regulations is permissible and
8. Id. at 130.
9. 111 J. GOLD, supra note 3, at 486-87 (relying on the Fund's Decision No. 144-(52/51)).
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may lead in certain cases to disregarding the effect of such regulations as
contrary to the forum's public policy. Gold is right to point out that the Fund
may approve, or at least not object to, discriminatory currency arrangements,
prompted not by economic considerations but by reasons of national or
international security. The United States' measures against Iran adopted in 1980
fall into this category. Gold quotes sources doubting whether the economic
threat mentioned by the U.S. Administration side by side with the threat to
U.S. security were indeed as serious as alleged. o Gold sees the dilemma that
such discriminatory currency arrangements will cause to a third State.'" On the
one hand, respect of such measures will embarrass its relations with the target
State. On the other hand, if the courts of the forum State hold such measures
contrary to its public policy the country having adopted the discriminatory
measure for security reasons will feel offended by this disregard of its security
interests. The solution of this quandary is clear at least as far as it concerns a
permanently neutral State. Such a State's public policy will militate against
recognition of such discriminatory measures as a valid defense to claims of
payment. We do not believe that the Fund's interpretation against reliance on
public policy arguments should indeed prevent the courts of a permanently
neutral State from declaring recognition of such acts of economic warfare
incompatible with that State's public policy of protecting its policy of neutrality.
Like Gold' 2 we consider article VIII, section 2(b) to be a shield and not a
sword. This article does not grant extraterritorial effect to other rules usually
figuring in exchange control regulations side by side with the rules on the
nonenforceability of contracts incompatible with the regulations concerned.
These other rules oblige domestic holders of foreign assets to declare them to the
exchange control authorities. Property of such assets is then vested in these
authorities, either automatically or as a sanction for the holder's failure to declare
such assets. Claims to enforce these rules either directly or indirectly have been
disregarded. Rejection of such claims is based on the principle of territoriality of
foreign penal or revenue laws. Recourse to public policy arguments thus
becomes redundant. 13 It would lead too far to discuss in the present context the
problem whether the territoriality of public law did authorize Austrian courts to
hold that a Yugoslav exchange control measure cannot prevent payments from an
account in an Austrian bank owned by a former resident of Yugoslavia or whether
article VIII, section 2(b) should have obliged the Austrian court to respect the
10. 11 J. GOLD, supra note 2, at 364-65.
11. III J. GOLD, supra note 3, at 488.
12. Id. at 384; cf. Solicitors for the Affairs of H.M. Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co., 304 N.Y.
282, 107 N.E.2d 488 (1952); Solicitors for the Affairs of H.M. Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co., 304
N.Y. 296, 107 N.E.2d 455 (1952).
13. 1. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 118 (1989).
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decision of the Yugoslav exchange control authorities to refuse to issue the
license necessary for this transaction under Yugoslav exchange control law. 14
The Fund's interpretation concerning the effect of public policy on the
enforceability of exchange contracts merely envisages the possibility of public
policy arguments being used in order to prevent reliance on article VIII, section
2(b) to be set aside. In exceptional circumstances, however, public policy
arguments might militate in favor of recognizing exchange control legislation
even in situations where such legislation would not be applicable under the
forum's conflict rules. ' 5 The first decision of the Court of Appeals in the Allied
Bank case' 6 required respect of Costa Rica's moratorium law by a U.S. policy to
support the reconstruction of Costa Rica's economy-even where the parties had
not relied on article VIII, section 2(b). This decision could not be upheld in view
of a brief of the U.S. Attorney General as amicus curiae stating that U.S. public
policy did not go so far. ' 7 Some authors 18 have regretted the lack of international
solidarity shown by the outcome of this litigation. Hahn' 9 has suggested that it
be left to the Fund to decide in any given case whether or not the Articles of the
Fund require recognition of another member State's exchange control legislation.
Actually the Fund is willing to give such interpretations upon the request of a
domestic court.2 ° Up to the present, however, only very few such requests have
been submitted by a court. In these cases the court concerned acted on its own
initiative. It seems at least doubtful whether many other courts will follow this
example unless compelled to do so by law. It seems even more doubtful whether
legislators would be willing to enact a law rendering obligatory the obtention of
such a preliminary ruling. Such a law would have to be similar to article 177 of
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. We doubt that States
would be ready to sacrifice on a worldwide level so important a part of their
sovereignty. 2
Yet, the idea of reciprocity may militate in favor of such recognition. After all,
nearly all States can envisage the possibility of running into economic difficulties
that could compel them to introduce exchange control regulations. They thus
14. Contra III J. GOLD, supra note 3, at 588 (disagreeing with Austrian Supreme Court opinion
of July 2, 1958).
15. II J. GOLD, supra note 2, at 222.
16. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 23 I.L.M. 742 (1984).
17. III J. GOLD, supra note 3, at 424-25.
18. Seidl-Hohenveldem, Umschuldung und internationales Privatrecht, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR
GERHARD KEGEL 621 (Musielak & Schurig eds. 1987).
19. Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning (or Losing) by Default: The Act of State Doctrine, Sovereign
Immunity and Comity in International Business Transactions, 19 IrT'L LAW. 254 (1985); Hahn,
Zahlungsmoratorium ausserhalb des Verbotsstaates kein Act of State,' 38 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR DAS
GESAMTE KREDITWESEN 892, 937 (1985).
20. 11 J. GOLD, supra note 2, at 144; III J. GOLD, supra note 3, at 286; J. GOLD, INTERPRTATION
BY THE FUND 46 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 11, 1968).
21. 1. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 12, at 163.
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could deem it to be to their advantage to recognize today another country's
exchange control regulations even insofar as they provide for the transfer to the
State of assets that its residents hold abroad. Such a State could hope that by
acting in this way today other countries tomorrow will be willing to recognize its
own regulation providing for such a transfer. Even at present, the notion of
reciprocity has led to a certain change of attitude in respect to exchange control
regulations in general. In the early days of the Fund, article VIII, section 2(b)
was held to be a privilege mutually granted by the Member States. A
non-Member State or a State having left the Fund could no longer count on such
respect for its exchange control regulations. 22 Gradually, however, such respect
appears to be granted also to exchange control regulations of non-Member
States. Their rules, too, will no longer be held to be per se contrary to the public
policy of the forum State. Austria maintains a sizeable amount of commercial
relations with Czechoslovakia, a nonmember country. Yet, there are no reported
Austrian decisions excluding the application of Czechoslovak exchange control
regulations for that reason.
This development is symptomatic of the tendency signalled by Gold that the
fundamental postulates that underlie the obligations resulting from the Fund
Agreement may affect also nonmembers. Writing in 196623 Gold did not want to
go so far as to claim that these rules have become part of customary international
law. Writing in 198624 Gold refers to the possibility of an opinion being created
by the existence of article VIII, section 2(b) to hold recourse to public policy no
longer justifiable under these circumstances. We may thus feel justified to assume
that this rule has made progress on its way to becoming part of customary
international law. We welcome this development, always provided recourse to
public policy shall remain admissible within the narrow limits set out above.
22. III J. GOLD, supra note 3, at 531; J. GOLD, THE FUND AND NON-MEMBER STATES: SOME LEGAL
Emcrs 30-32 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 7, 1966) [hereinafter J. GOLD, NON-MEMBER STATES]
(quoting approvingly Stephen V. Zivnostenska Banka, 31 Misc. 2d 45, 140 N.Y.S.2d 323, aff'd, 286
A.D. 999, 145 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1955); Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Lorido, 19 Fla. Supp. 167 (11 th
Cir. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 154 So. 2d 200 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 155 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 990 (1964)).
23. J. GOLD, NON-MEMBER STATES, supra note 21, at 24.
24. Id. at 566.
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